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In the late 2000s, a process started that was de-
signed to approximate the national disaster risk
assessments in the European Union. Member
states are currently obliged to prepare their as-
sessments every three years. The European
Commission will summarize the results, which
should not only lead to a better overview of
common risks but also direct future joint activities
and investments. To date, two rounds of this new
practice have been implemented and sum-
marised. The present study investigates how and
why this largely informal integrative practice was
born, how it is facilitated, and how successful it
has been vis‐à‐vis the expectations, especially
achieving a relative comparability of the national
risk assessments.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment (RA) in the field of disaster risk management (DRM) assumed greater
importance in the European Union (EU) in 2009 when it was decided that the European
Commission (EC) should facilitate an approximation of national risk assessments (NRAs)
and collate the results, focusing on common European risks. This, in turn, would guide
the EU‐level DRM, especially in terms of prioritizing joint investments and activities. A
certain approximation of concepts and methodologies was presupposed in order to
Risks Hazards Crisis Public Policy. 2021;1–21. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rhc3 | 1
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution‐NonCommercial License, which
permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for
commercial purposes.
© 2021 The Authors. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Policy Studies
Organization
produce comparable NRA results. To date, this practice has been conducted twice, and
the third round is expected to result in updated NRAs by the end of 2020. The third EC
overview will then be produced in 2021.
The question that inevitably arises with regard to the above is why member states
would voluntarily transfer any mandate for supranational coordination in this parti-
cular field. Is this a rare exception, or does it point to what is termed “creeping
competence” in enhancing supranationality? If so, what does it entail?
This article analyzes this relatively recent development within European DRM. It
begins by identifying the regulative decisions and guidelines that instigated and le-
gitimated the new practice. The majority of the article is then devoted to evaluating
the quality and comparability of those NRAs that have been completed. Lastly, some
potential explanations are given for this integrative development, whereby the EC has
increased its formal and informal role in a field that basically belongs to the member
states' sovereignty. As the article shows, these explanations are not unambiguous.
REGULATION AND FACILITATION
The idea of approximating NRAs most likely arose during the routine policymaking
process in the context of the much wider issue of European DRM in the Civil Pro-
tection Unit of the EC DG Environment (now under DG Echo). Obviously, if the EC was
not entirely sure what the disaster‐related challenges of the member states entailed, it
was logical to ask them to prepare documents to that effect.
EC units do not work on an ad hoc basis, however. Consequently, issues such as
the approximation of NRAs for better DRM—a goal which seems highly beneficial for
member states as well—still takes time and effort, and always requires some kind of
regulatory backing and practical facilitation.
Regulation with sensitivity
The EC Communication on a Community approach on the prevention of natural and
man‐made disasters from February 2009 is usually seen as the regulatory starting
point for a more coordinated European NRA approach. A Communication is a policy
document with no mandatory authority and which has no legal effect. The NRAs were
discussed under the subheading “Developing guidelines on hazard/risk mapping” and
were condensed into less than half a page. The main message was that the diversity of
methodological approaches toward nationally produced risk information had reduced
the comparability of information and made it difficult for information to be con-
solidated at the European level. As a result, there was no overall picture of the risks
that the EU was facing (EC, 2009, item 3.1.3).
In November 2009, the Council of the European Union acknowledged in its Conclusions
that “hazard and risk identification and analysis, impact analysis, RAs and matrices, sce-
nario development, risk management measures, and regular reviews” are major compo-
nents of the Community disaster prevention policies. The Conclusions also called on the
EC to develop guidelines before the end of 2010 to facilitate NRAs, thereby ensuring better
comparability between member states. A cross‐sectoral overview of the major “natural
and man‐made risks that the EU may face” needed to be prepared before the end of 2012
(Council of the European Union, 2009, Art. 28, 30).
The first EC (2014) overview was finally published, with a compilation of the results of
around two‐thirds of the member states. It is possible that the delays and initial
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experiences in collecting the incomplete sample of NRAs had led to the current prac-
tice based on a binding Council Decision as a part of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism
(UCPM). The member states were now obliged to “develop risk assessments at the na-
tional or appropriate subnational level and make available to the Commission a summary
of the relevant elements thereof by 22 December 2015 and every three years thereafter”
(European Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2013, Art. 6/a). However, making it
mandatory to prepare the NRAs for the EC, thus revealing some country‐related vulner-
abilities, is of course a balancing act between the powers of themember states and the EU.
It is therefore duly mentioned that the obligation only concerns “sharing non‐sensitive
information, namely information whose disclosure would not be contrary to the essential
interests of Member States' security” (Preamble/8 and Art. 6 introduction).
In March 2019, a new version of the abovementioned Decision was issued.
Only a few amendments were made in respect to the current subject area (European
Parliament/Council of the European Union, 2019, Art 6). The main change concerned
the shift from mere RA to an emphasis on prevention and preparedness, as well as a
stronger focus on cross‐border risks. The Decision obliges the member states to
submit their subsequent editions to the EC by the end of 2020, “and every three years
thereafter and whenever there are important changes”.
Facilitation with guidelines and overviews
The EC's task was to achieve at least some level of comparability with regard to the
NRAs in order to prepare better‐coordinated policy initiatives. There are five relevant
documents to consider in this respect.
The first guidelines (EC, 2010a) comprise a 42‐page document on improving the
use of good practices and international standards across the EU, and serve to further
the gradual development of coherent and consistent RA methodology and terminol-
ogy. The nonbinding guidelines certainly provide very useful background information,
along with the necessary definitions, establishing the expected scope and presenting
available techniques for NRAs.
The first overview of the NRAs (EC, 2014) is an 86‐page document, based on only
18 NRAs. In the body text, the document is concerned for the most part with identified
hazards rather than any deeper methodological comparability of NRAs. Consequently,
of all the 25 hazards identified in the NRAs, a list of the 12 most addressed is duly
overviewed, representing the priority list of hazards that the EU should focus on. The
Annexes, however, contain some comparative methodological tables from the NRAs.
After the second round, the subsequent second overview (EC, 2017) is a 112‐page
document. The 2013 Council Decision had apparently paid off, as the overview in-
cluded contributions from all 28 member states and three (of the six) additional UCPM
participant countries. Like the 2014 overview, it organizes its body text according to
the hazards, although it discusses the generic picture more extensively, including
such issues as key trends, interdependencies, and cascading effects. In its overview of
hazards, the so‐called new hazards (e.g., the migrant crisis, antimicrobial resistance,
space weather) are also apparent, reflecting the new themes in the NRAs. Again, the
Annexes are highly useful, providing comparative methodological tables. The gaps in
the tables show that quite a few countries had not provided sufficient material to
conduct a full analysis.
The second guidelines (EC, 2019a) were published after the second round and
hence were not used in preparing the latest NRAs. The guidelines consist of a non-
binding 26‐page document, which takes the form of a template of questions to which
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the member state is supposed to formulate its answers. The document then provides
rather detailed guidance as to what should be considered under each question.
Compared to the 2010 guidelines (EC, 2010a), the scope is broader than mere RA,
following the abovementioned 2019 Council Decision. Thus, the next NRAs should
also include a risk management capability assessment as well as a description of
priority prevention and preparedness measures, especially when it comes to key risks
with cross‐border impacts, and risks with a low probability but high impact.
Simultaneously with the second guidelines, the EC/DG Joint Research Centre (JRC)
released recommendations (EC, 2019b), which cannot be regarded as official guide-
lines, but rather as JRC scientific support for the DG Echo and member states. They
still serve as an indicator of the challenges identified by the EC in the 2017 overview.
The 162‐page (!) recommendations attest to the fact that more effort has to be
invested in the quality and comparability of NRAs.
ISO 31000 as a baseline standard
The EC did not have to start from scratch when preparing its guidelines. Risks, in
general, are widely researched from multiple perspectives (for a review, see Kuipers
et al., 2018). RA proper, in turn, is a well‐established multidisciplinary academic
field informed by numerous peer‐reviewed journals and textbooks (e.g., Aven, 2015;
Coleman, 2011; Ostrom &Wilhelmsen, 2012; Pritchard, 2015; Yoe, 2012). Furthermore,
efforts have been made to systematize RA in terms of standards. The most prominent
of the relevant standards is the International Organization of Standardization (ISO)
31000 Risk Management standard. The first edition was approved in 2009 (ISO, 2009a,
2009b; ISO/IEC, 2009) and was recently updated (ISO, 2018; ISO/IEC, 2019). ISO 31000
is professed to be applicable to organizations of “all types and sizes,” and hence
also to NRAs. Within the risk management community, ISO 31000 has been both
welcomed (Lalonde & Boiral, 2012; Purdy, 2010) and criticized (Aven, 2011, 2016; Aven
& Ylönen, 2019; Leich, 2010). Moreover, the so‐called risk governance school concerns
RA, or risk management as a whole, as a too limited approach. It claims that
today's systemic, interdependent and complex risks need a much more horizontal and
multilevel governance approach (Ansell & Baur, 2018; Galaz et al., 2017; Renn, 2008,
2006; Schweizer & Renn, 2019).
Nevertheless, the ISO 31000 standard's obvious achievement is the approx-
imation of the terminology and general understanding of the risk management
process among practitioners. The EC had already approved ISO 31000 as a basis for
NRAs in its first guidelines (EC, 2010a), and continued to enforce the standard in
the subsequent EC/JRC recommendations (2019b), like many other international
organizations (Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development, 2018;
UNDRR/UNISDR, 2017). While ISO 31000 is no longer referred to in the latest of-
ficial EC (2019a) guidelines, in practice the document continues to follow the same
ISO‐based lines as before.
EVALUATION OF THE NRAs
Has the effort to approximate European NRAs been successful? We address this
question by systematically evaluating the available results against the aforemen-
tioned EC documents as well as the original goals and objectives, paying specific
attention to the comparability of the NRAs.
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Data and comparative indicators
While the latest EC overview (2017) makes full use of the 28 + 3 NRAs, for outsiders
only a handful can be found in public sources, especially in their English editions. We
have identified eight of these. Some were published/updated after the 2014–2015
editions that were used in the EC's (2017) latest overview. We pay particular attention
to the latest available editions, listed in Table 1. Due to the data limitations (our
sample is 8/31 or 26%), our analysis necessarily draws only a rough and perhaps
somewhat biased picture of state of the art. By the same token, it is plausible that the
published NRAs represent the better than average in terms of quality.
For our comparative evaluation, we have chosen three basic indicators:
1. how the concept of “risk” is defined?
2. how the task of “risk assessment” is understood?
3. what type of methodology is used?
The EC overviews (2014, 2019a), as well as its nonbinding guidelines (2010a, 2019a,
2019b), provide a natural reference point for our evaluation. As the 2010 guidelines di-
recting the latest round are literally based on ISO 31000, this international standard can
also be used as an authoritative nonbinding reference point. Furthermore, to gather more
hands‐on information, we have also interviewed some practitioners both from the parti-
cipating countries and the EC who have been involved with the processes discussed here.1
To enhance the comparability of our findings, we have formalized our evaluation,
with slight adaptations, on the four‐score weighted scale proposed by ISO in a related
field (ISO/IEC, 2014, 5.3), as indicated in Table 2.
What this means is that we understand the three basic indicators above, and their
subcategories, as organizational process capability goals that have more or less been
achieved compared to the guidelines and standards presented above and detailed
below. Our evaluation of the NRAs is, of course, subjective.
Definition of risk
Clear risk definition
An effective RA includes a clear‐cut definition of what constitutes a “risk.” The
most simplistic definition is that “Risk = likelihood × consequences.” The concepts
of “probability” and “impact” are often used instead if one wants to emphasize
measurability. A somewhat more complicated risk definition should take into ac-
count the functional relationship of these two variables, namely that the value of
one variable varies with changes in the values of a second variable. Following the
EC (2010a, p. 16) guidelines, this is the case, for instance, when the consequences
of a hazard are also a function of the preventive and preparatory measures to
reduce the risk. In this case, one often uses the terms “probability” (p), “vulner-
ability” (V), and “exposure” (E) to express this function (f). The result is a nonlinear
curve, which is expressed as “Risk = ƒ(p × E × V).” While the latest edition of
the guidelines (EC, 2019a) does not include any formal risk definition, the JRC
recommendations (EC, 2019b, p. 27) adopt the definition “H × E × V = R.” The left‐
hand symbols for H(azard), E(xposure), and V(ulnerability) are collectively defined
as underlying risk drivers and capacities, whereas R(isk) is defined as the potential
for future losses.
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All‐hazard approach
The EC (2010a, 2019a, 2019b) guidelines expect the NRAs to be based on the all‐hazard
approach, as opposed to merely focusing on certain types of hazards, such as terrorism
or natural disasters. This approach is formalized in the EC (2010b, Action 2) Internal
Security Strategy, where the task of the European‐level RA was literally defined as
“covering in principle all‐natural and man‐made disasters.” In more detailed definitions,
one usually differentiates between nonmalicious and malicious man‐made hazards, and
technological hazards are often understood as a separate risk category.
Including complex/multirisks
Risks might be regarded as unrelated phenomena, as individual risks. However, in the RA
literature (e.g., Aven & Zio, 2014; Carpignano et al., 2009; Gallina et al., 2016), as well as in
the EC (2010a, 2019a, 2019b) guidelines, encouragement is also given to consider so‐called
complex and multirisks. Many disaster risks are naturally multirisks, like extreme weather,
for example, may trigger technological and social risks. Complex multirisks are, however,
difficult to estimate based on the historical data because such data does not provide much
evidence for anticipating the thousands of potential coincidences, dependencies, and
interdependencies. Consequently, to identify the possible multirisk chains, one may have
to use rather complicated modeling and simulations (e.g., Komendantova et al., 2014;
Mun, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2011), or add well‐structured “what if” scenarios or similar
qualitative techniques (Card et al., 2012; Han & Weng, 2011).
Including cross‐border risks
The EC (2010a, pp. 32–34) guidelines have a section on cross‐border risks. While they
do not actually demand the same from NRAs, they “encourage” the development of
cross‐border RAs, “in particular on floods.” In contrast, the 2019 guidelines (EC, 2019a)
emphasize cross‐border risks in particular, asking member states to focus on the ‘key’
cross‐border risks. While the latter guidelines were not in place before the last round, one
could still expect the NRAs to touch upon the cross‐border dimensions of risks.
Multilevel consequences
The EC (2010a, p. 17) guidelines differentiate between the human, economic and
environmental, and political/social consequences or impact: “In risk identification and
risk analysis, all three categories of impacts should always be considered when
TABLE 2 Evaluation scale
Evaluation Description (% of goals)
Not achieved (NA) Goals not achieved (15%)
Partly achieved (PA) Goals partly achieved (+35%)
Largely achieved (LA) Goals largely achieved (+35%)
Fully achieved (FA) Goals fully achieved (+15%)
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assessing the impact of any analyzed event, hazard, or risk, including for risk sce-
narios and multi‐risk assessments.” This is repeated in the 2019 edition, with specific
emphasis on risks that “have significant adverse human, economic, environmental
and political/social impacts (including security)” (EC, 2019a, p. C 428/15).
How does our sample of NRAs measure up in terms of the above‐described
perspectives? Table 3 summarizes our findings in accordance with the evaluation
scale presented in Table 2.
As Table 3 shows, the results are mixed. Most countries include a short description
of the risk concept, but some do not discuss it at all. In general, the countries score quite
well on including multi‐ and cascading risks, and multilevel risk impacts, but there are
some shortcomings when it comes to taking an all‐hazard approach. Some countries
tend to direct the focus of the assessments toward well‐known natural hazards, such as
earthquakes and hurricanes, with limited focus on emerging and new threats. Never-
theless, the majority of countries manage to capture a wide range of hazards that could
possibly affect vital functions in society. For instance, Denmark defines a broad range of
incident types, stating that “an incident means a delimited sequence of events that has
significant and immediate negative consequences for society […]” (DEMA, 2017, p. 6),
not excluding any hazard or threat when identifying risks. Sweden defines four risk
categories: natural hazards, major accidents, disruption to technical infrastructure and
supply systems, and antagonistic incidents (MSB, 2016, p. 11). Most countries also
highlight the cross‐border and global nature of risk. However, this is often included only
indirectly, while comprehensive cross‐border RAs are lacking.
Understanding RA
Even a cursory glance at the RA literature reveals that the vocabulary is rather
confusing (cf. Renn, 2006, Annexes A–B, pp. 86–156). The EC (2010a) guidelines rely
on ISO 31000 for a clear, comparable reference point. However, while the 2019
guidelines edition (EC, 2019a) does not mention ISO, it largely follows the previous
edition in its RA guidance. The JRC recommendations (EC, 2019b), instead, are
literally based on the ISO 31000 guidelines. Hence, we should expect the member
states to follow the recommended standard to some extent.
















DK 2017 LA LA PA PA LA
FI 2019 NA LA LA PA LA
IT 2018 PA NA PA PA PA
NL 2016 LA LA LA PA LA
NO 2019 PA LA LA PA LA
PL 2015 PA PA LA PA LA
SE 2016 PA LA LA LA LA
UK 2017 PA LA LA PA LA
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According to this standard, the umbrella concept is risk management. This refers to
all of the coordinated activities illustrated in Figure 1.
Thus, RA is a part of this broader process. Before any organization, in our case a
member state embarks on preparing an RA, several parameters must be in place.
The ISO standard speaks about the scope, context, and criteria (ISO, 2018), while
others may use such expressions as defining the risk environment (Pritchard, 2015,
pp. 26–33). The JRC recommendations (EC, 2019b, pp. 17, 18) define the specific
context for NRAs (albeit not available before the latest NRA round) as follows: what
should be protected; which hazards the country is exposed to; which impacts should
be considered; a time window for the assessed risks; the classification of likelihood
and impact levels; quality levels in terms of uncertainty acceptance; a protocol for the
use of expert opinion; and risk criteria for evaluating the risks to be treated.
During the whole risk management process, one is expected to engage in a
communication and consultation process with the stakeholders to ensure that all of
the risks and specific interests, priorities, knowledge, and expertise will be taken into
account. In our case, it would include the relevant national and local authorities, but
the private sector (e.g., infrastructure operators), civil society (relevant NGOs such as
the Red Cross), and academia (research institutions) should also be consulted. This
information is supposed to be found in the NRAs.
Risk identification is the initial process of recognizing and recording risks. It
comprises a mapping exercise, leading to a preliminary long list of risks and their
possible combinations. It should include risks whereby the source(s) can be controlled
by an organization, as well as those that cannot be controlled.
Risk analysis is about determining the level of risk in particular, at least by making
a likelihood analysis and consequence analysis and then combining these two vari-
ables into a risk. In this phase of NRA, one usually deals with several risks pinpointed
in the risk identification phase. One then assesses individual risks one by one before
finally putting them in a comparable perspective, for instance, in a risk matrix, in order
to gauge the relative risk levels.
F IGURE 1 ISO 31000 risk management process
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Risk evaluation, as the last phase of RA proper, is the process of comparing the
results of the risk analysis with the risk criteria to determine whether the risk is tol-
erable or not (i.e., whether it needs to be “sent on” for risk treatment). In the EC's first
guidelines (2010a), valid for the most recent round, it was expected that risk evalua-
tion would be included in the NRAs.
The ISO 31000 framework also presupposes that risk management is not a one‐
time exercise, but rather an iterative process that should be constantly monitored and
reviewed. The indicator in our case concerns whether the current NRA has taken into
account the possible changes in the risk environment and changed or added some-
thing to the current edition compared to the previous one(s). We only have a rough
estimation of this as we do not always have access to previous NRA editions (even if
they may exist).
Table 4 presents our estimations of how well the NRAs follow the indicator‐based
scheme above.
All eight countries have a rather good understanding of the basic elements of RA.
In particular, “monitoring and reviewing” receive high scores, indicating that all or
most countries continuously update their assessments. Some countries fail to define
and set the scope for the assessment in detail, with inadequate explanations of how
the different scenarios are identified and why they are included. However, most of the
countries define the scope and set the context in a systematic and comprehensive
manner, also presenting the criteria for the assessment. For instance, the Netherlands
explains how a scenario is obtained, presents the requirements of a scenario (in terms
of likelihood and consequences), and indicates the time horizon for the incident sce-
narios. All countries include satisfactory risk identification and analysis. However,
there seems to be a trend among the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, and
Denmark) of prioritizing comprehensive capability assessments rather than, or in
addition to, risk analysis; this feature was indeed duly added to the latest EC (2019a)
guidelines.
At the lower end, risk evaluation stands out as being the weaker (or missing)
component. Only one country included a formalized risk evaluation, using risk ac-
ceptance levels. Indeed, the latest EC guidelines (2019a, p. C 428/15), published after
the last round, reacted by stating that risk evaluation would no longer be required in
the NRAs due to its “political nature.” The Swedish NRA summary provides some
indication of what this means: “MSB deems it very difficult, if not impossible, to

















DK 2017 LA LA LA PA NA LA
FI 2019 PA LA LA PA NA PA
IT 2018 PA PA PA LA PA LA
NL 2016 LA LA LA LA PA LA
NO 2019 LA PA LA LA NA LA
PL 2015 LA PA LA LA LA LA
SE 2016 PA LA PA/LA PA NA LA
UK 2017 PA/LA LA LA LA PA LA
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determine thresholds for acceptable levels of risk. Furthermore, measures should not
be prioritized based on a risk evaluation, but should instead be prioritized based on
vulnerabilities and deficiencies in capabilities identified in the scenario analyses.
Consequently, the Swedish assessment does not include a risk evaluation”
(MSB, 2016, p. 10). Nor does the Norwegian NRA, albeit for a different reason: “The
last two steps of the risk management process—risk evaluation and risk treatment—
are not included [… in the NRA]. Herein the responsibility lies with the individual
ministries, which must also make a more detailed analysis of risks and vulnerability
within their own area of responsibility” (DSB, 2019b, p. 8).
Methodology of the NRAs
Presumably, the biggest challenge for the NRAs is methodological. To evaluate this
issue, we have chosen to focus on five indicators that we see as being the most
appropriate given the methodological guidelines proposed by the EC (2010a, 2019a,
2019b), as well as the more general RA literature.
Input type
ISO 31000 (ISO/IEC, 2009, 2019) discusses several RA methodologies in some
detail, always stating certain basic input elements, be they basic societal data,
historical loss data, expert evaluation, and so forth. There is one input metho-
dology that feeds through the whole RA process, namely well‐developed scenarios
in NRAs. The EC guidelines (EC, 2010a, pp. 13, 21, 22) and JRC (Poljanšek et al.,
2017, pp. 13, 47) ostensibly recommend using scenarios to examine complex and
untypical developments in particular.
Reliability
Intuitively, one should demand some kind of reliability from an RA, no matter which
type of methodology (quantitative, semiquantitative, or qualitative) one uses. The
simplest characteristic of reliability is that the same information can be obtained re-
peatedly, irrespective of who gathers the information or designs the process. While in
qualitative analysis the data is not strictly repeatable and measurable, such attributes
as a reflection on one's own perspectives, representativeness of the findings in rela-
tion to the phenomena, consistency, or auditability can be demanded (Golafshani,
2003; Mayring, 2004).
Validity
While the study may be reliable, it does not mean that its methodology is valid
(Creswell & Miller, 2000; Noble & Smith, 2015; Whittemore et al., 2001). In our context,
validity is best understood to the extent that the methodology assesses the right
elements of the issue one wants to assess. In the RA literature (e.g., Pritchard, 2015;
Yoe, 2012), the message is that the methodology should be chosen depending on the
task at hand. This may require the use of separate methodologies or combinations
thereof for each RA phase (see Figure 1), as expressed in the ISO standard's attached
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technical document (ISO/IEC, 2009, 2019). Furthermore, the JRC recommendations
(EC, 2019b, p. 30) make the point that each type of hazard also requires its specific RA
methodology.
Uncertainty
However, the criteria of reliability and validity are problematic when the uncertainties
are extensive (Aven, 2016, p. 3; cf. Bellavita, 2006; Gundel, 2005; Veenema & Woolsey,
2012). Strictly speaking, the distinction between risk and uncertainty is that risks based
on historical loss data and known vulnerabilities can be described as strictly prob-
abilistic outcome distributions, whereas uncertainty cannot (Andersen, et al., 2014,
pp. 37, 38; Pritchard, 2015, p. 7). It is therefore important for it to be clearly expressed
whether it is a question of a probabilistic risk or whether it is about a nonprobabilistic
uncertainty or a combination of some sort, and how this ambiguity is assessed. For
the latter alternative, there are plenty of semiquantitative and qualitative methodol-
ogies available for different types of expert assessments (e.g. ISO/IEC, 2019) that may
be deemed reliable and/or valid, with a certain level of uncertainty of output (Aven,
2016; Klinke & Renn, 2002; Mastrandrea et al., 2010).
Output type
In the generic RA literature, as well as in the EC guidelines (2010a, 2019a, 2019b) and
ISO 31000, one usually differentiates between quantitative, semiquantitative, and
qualitative methodologies. While ISO 31000 does not directly recommend using any
particular methodology, one of the main criteria for a methodology is whether it can
provide quantitative output. The EC seems to lean toward quantitative methodologies,
at least when it comes to the consequence/impact side of the risk: “Impact analysis
should rely as much as possible on empirical evidence and experience from past
disaster data or established quantitative models of impact” (EC, 2010a, p. 18). The JRC
recommendations (EC, 2019b, p. 20) emphasize more strictly that the results of the
NRA “should be quantified and presented in a way that is useful to the stakeholders.”
Table 5 presents a summary that draws on our evaluation of the NRAmethodologies
following the above indicators.
All eight countries included historical data as well as expert evaluation to a large
extent in their assessments. A good example is a Norwegian assessment, which used
different types of data sources, depending on the scenario. For instance, when ana-
lyzing a natural hazard, technical and scientific methods were applied, integrating
quantitative (historical) data to estimate probabilities. At the same time, methods
closer to social science were used to analyze other types of scenarios, such as mal-
icious attacks, integrating knowledge from experts to estimate both the likelihood and
the consequences of certain scenarios. However, there were some weaknesses
among the NRAs when it comes to how the data was collected, systematized, and
processed, duly affecting reliability. With respect to validity and uncertainty, only one
country used tailored quantitative RA methodologies for each natural hazard. Most
countries included some uncertainty assessment, but this was only qualitative in
general. Yet those who did better than most used a systematic, transparent, and well‐
considered uncertainty assessment methodology (e.g., DSB, 2019b, pp. 19, 20; NIPHE,
2016, p. 13), whereas others were content with a rather intuitive assessment. A
common approach was to present the RA results on some kind of semiquantitative
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scale (such as low, medium, high). A few countries only included a discussion on the
occurrence and impact of the scenarios, while only one country presented purely
quantitative results.
WHAT EXPLAINS THE UNFINISHED EUROPEANIZATION
OF NRAs?
While the approximation effort with regard to the NRAs has been based on rather
minimal regulation at the European Union level, the EC has nevertheless acquired
certain responsibilities beyond its original powers in the respective policy area. It has
been able to gather a great deal of useful information through the practice discussed
above and to influence the national NRA practices to some extent. This development
has taken place in a field that, in principle, is not subject to supranational policies.
The weakness of the EC mandate?
Despite the achievements, the original main goal, namely the comparability of NRAs,
has not been entirely successful thus far. Based on our evaluation above, as well as on
the EC's (2014, 2017) own overviews, and confirmed by our small‐scale personal in-
terviews, the quality level, in general, is too uneven and the methodological choices too
diverse to enable a scientifically sound comparison between countries. The EC (2010a)
guidelines as such, had they been followed, would have resulted in a more comparable
overview as they are based on the ISO 31000 standard. However, at least one of our
interviewees, responsible for preparing a member state's NRA, remarked that ISO 31000
is designed for organizations and is therefore unsuitable for NRAs, duly flagging up
some basic differences with regard to what should constitute a national‐level RA.
One could simply argue that the existing regulation, in spite of its vagueness,
explains the successes of the current integration effort, and the weakness of the EC
mandate, in turn, the shortcomings.
Or creeping competence of the EC?
Yet it is interesting to consider this process from awider European integration perspective.
The above‐described development is indeed not untypical in the European Union. It fol-
lows the tendency of what has been labeled “creeping competence” (Pollack, 1994, 2000;
Princen, 2016; Princen & Rhinard, 2006) or “informal governance” (Christiansen et al.,
2004; cf. Kleine, 2014) in the European integration literature. The current study thus con-
firms the previous empirical observations in such fields, inter alia, as the environment,
regional development, research and technological development (Pollack, 1994), critical
infrastructure protection (Pursiainen, 2009), energy (Maltby, 2013), civil security (Kirchner
et al., 2015), Common Foreign and Security Policy (Bergmann, 2019; Riddervold, 2016;
Riddervold & Rosén, 2016), and health policy (Greer & Löblová, 2017).
A functionalist need?
In terms of traditional integration theories, the slowly but surely developing in-
tegrative practice described above can firstly be seen as an application of the
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traditional functionalist approach (Haas, 1958), or its revised neofunctionalist version
(Haas, 1964, 1990; Schmitter, 2005). States are voluntarily assigning some expert‐level
duties, control, and authority to a supranational power in the name of their func-
tionalist needs. In our case, these needs are related to the EU‐level coordination of
DRM, including investments, operative support, training, R&D, and so forth in con-
ditions where many risks have a cross‐border dimension.
This development can also be seen as a spillover from closely related fields, within
the preconditions of growing risk interdependencies. If technical agenda‐setting
power is regarded as included in the (neo)functionalist toolbox (Greer & Löblová,
2017; Princen, 2016, p. 361; Princen & Rhinard, 2006), its inherent logic necessarily
enhances supranational elements in the governance of the EU member states.
The rational state?
Yet the intergovernmentalist logic (Moravcsik, 1993, 1994; Moravcsik & Nicolaïdis,
1999; Rosamond, 2000, pp. 130–156) could also be defended to some extent, pointing
to the fact that this development is best explained by relying on the assumption of
rational states behaving according to their self‐interest. In our case, one could argue
that member states are just working in a win‐win setting with the EU but are still well
aware of their sovereignty. This logic has, however, often been seen as incapable of
capturing the real dynamics in European policies in such “hybrid” areas as ours (e.g.,
Kirchner et al., 2015).
Yet, reflecting the intergovernmentalist logic, one could also point out the differ-
ence between high politics and the low‐politics process (Princen & Rhinard, 2006). The
technical character of the current issue area might indeed explain the relatively
smooth implementation of the NRA approximation, as far as it does not penetrate
high‐politics interests. Some case studies following the same logic have also sug-
gested that while the EC may influence emerging integrative developments when the
process is in its infancy, the member states are likely to increase their influence when
the process is institutionalized (De la Porte, 2011). One should then expect a phase
during which member states redefine the original task or their ownership of the
approximated NRA process. Indeed, some signs of this were identified above.
Multilevel governance in the context of asymmetry of information?
Furthermore, the current case could also be regarded as an example of European
multilevel governance (Tömmel & Verdun, 2009) or a hybrid governance system, where
nearly all policy areas are covered by the EU, either through formal competences or, as
in our case, through coordination and facilitation. Our case could then be explained by
the claim that the structure of governance is supposed to reflect the efficient production
of the public good (European DRM) and/or that governance should at least mirror the
patterns of the community (the EU) where it takes place (Schakel et al., 2015).
Some studies have considered bargaining theories, with varied results
(Riddervold, 2016), while others have proposed semi‐official policy networks
(Christiansen et al., 2004) to explain the increasing informal supranational power. It is,
however, difficult to find evidence to that effect for our case. More relevant, perhaps,
is the principal‐agent theory (De la Porte, 2011; Pollack, 2003). The governments
(principal) delegate their power to the EC (agent) due to an asymmetry of information,
with the latter being able to obtain a better overview of European‐level risks.
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Positivist or postpositivist explanation?
As none of the above grand or middle‐range theories as such can be dismissed as
irrelevant, in the era of “analytic eclecticism” in international studies (Haas & Haas,
2002; Sil & Katzenstein, 2010) one is inclined to open the door to combining some
theoretical perspectives. In essence, this eclecticism is already at the core of neo-
functionalism (Schmitter, 2005). One example of this kind of amalgam is Boin et al.'s
(2013) effort to explain the institutionalization of the European level of crisis man-
agement from a more general perspective. They consider three “dimensions” in their
descriptive explanation, including the regulatory outputs (the more the better), net-
work configurations within a sector (the tighter the better), and level of legitimacy (the
higher the better).
The above is also applicable to our case, where we can find a combination of
bottom‐up and top‐down elements, working imperfectly and gradually, but still
creating a kind of “creeping competence” logic of integration in our particular field.
Yet no conclusive lessons can be drawn from our exercise in terms of how to explain
such phenomena. Should we look at this from a social science perspective, it seems
that both positivist and constructivist logic apply.
From a positivist perspective, the functional integrative pressure would be the
independent factor. The dependent variable, that which we aim to explain, would be
the more or less approximated NRAs. The EC, and its interactions with the member
states' civil protection authorities, would then be the intervening variable. The inter-
vening variable would in this case explain the outcome, because it would not have
happened without it, at least in such a manner and at this time.
From a postpositivist perspective, it is more about the constantly revolving agent‐
structure interaction. Initiated by the EC, or perhaps by some persuasive individuals
within this particular bureaucracy, the discussion ultimately turned from national risks
toward common or similar risks incurred by the member states. The previous struc-
ture of nationally defined risks was therefore challenged. The initial reports from the
EC made sense to the higher‐level decision‐makers. The agency of both the EC and the
member states' civil protection authorities, their activity or inactivity, professionalism
or nonprofessionalism, had to re‐orientate to this new demand. The negotiated
agreements and conflicts, in the absence of a ready‐made supranational governance
system, then produced a temporarily agreed‐upon but variously understood new
structure in this particular field.
CONCLUSIONS
The current study has focused on national disaster RA in Europe, an area where the
member states still have sovereignty, but where the EU/EC has gradually assumed
more tasks and power with regard to its guidelines, agenda‐setting, deadlines, and
overviews. The regulation, agreed by all member states, is not excessive, but with its
obligation to produce NRAs every three years, it is still rather effective.
It has then become the task of the EC to facilitate the comparability and quality of
the NRAs, albeit without any enforcement mechanism. The EC has become increas-
ingly sophisticated and ambitious over time, with the whole process probably serving
as a learning process in itself. While its guidelines and subsequent overviews are not
binding upon the member states, the level of normative pressure is implicitly in-
creased, expressing some dissatisfaction as to the quality of some of the NRAs and
their general comparability.
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The above discussion indicates that this development has not been without chal-
lenges. While the current practice has led to a quantitative and qualitative gradual
enhancement of the knowledge needed to assess disaster risks in Europe and in in-
dividual countries, it has resulted in mixed results as to the quality and comparability of
the NRAs. The latest EC (2019a) guidelines, with an approach based on a questionnaire,
are designed to enhance the comparability of the NRAs in the future. At the same time,
some difficult issues, such as the role of ISO 31000 or risk evaluation, are circumvented
to avoid controversy. While this might foster cooperation, it does not resolve the un-
derlying methodological disagreements and enhance the comparability of NRAs.
Based on our short discussion on the mechanisms of integration, we concluded
that there are several theoretical approaches that provide partial explanations of our
case. The best candidate, however, might be neofunctionalism, which would capture
most of the elements that we see in our case. One can pinpoint two relevant inter-
related features of this logic. First, it is argued that integration is not to be seen as a
conflict‐free and automatic deepening or spill‐over process. Second, a mere func-
tionalist integration will fall short if political leaders (as well as citizens) do not become
interested in partially shifting their loyalties, expectations, and political activities be-
yond existing national bodies to the interstate and perhaps supranational level.
Whether or not this deepening integration will be the future of NRAs is more
important in this context than the triennial practice itself, or even DRM in more generic
terms. If disaster risks become more Europeanized, it means that policymakers and
citizens alike will share European rather than mere national risk scenarios and will also
demand more European‐level solutions. The converse, naturally, is that the member
states will mainly define their risks on a national basis, and try to find national solu-
tions, respectively. The latter may effectively serve to undermine the larger European
project in the future, particularly during major crises and disasters.
ENDNOTE
1(a) In‐depth interview of one of the key European Commission officials in this field (on September 28,
2018); (b) in‐depth interview of a person responsible for the NRA process in a member state (January 21,
2019); (c) an email exchange with a person responsible for another member state's NRA process (January
10, 2020); and (d) aworkshop discussing the processes related to NRA with the participation of practitioners
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